1914 Joseph Joffre

1 1914

1.1 battle of frontiers
1.2 retreat
1.3 marne

1914
battle of frontiers

at outbreak of war, french plan clashed german schlieffen plan, detriment of french. on 15 august, after german cavalry had been spotted @ dinant on meuse, , after repeated warnings charles lanrezac of fifth army, joffre issued instruction particuliere no 10, stating main german effort come through belgium.

although joffre aware (8am on 18 august) many fifteen german corps moving through belgium (in fact sixteen, , twenty-eight if german fourth , fifth armies included), believed few of these come west of meuse, believed held british , belgians. french third , fourth armies preparing attack ardennes, , wanted lanrezac s fifth army attack bulk of german right wing on west flank – assumed – attacked left flank of french fourth army.

the french first , second armies attacked alsace-lorraine on 19 , 20 august , beaten severe loss german forces, preparing counteroffensive. joffre believed (20 august) liège still holding out (in fact last of liège forts had fallen on 16 august), , hoped lanrezac able reach namur, expected hold out longer. germans entered brussels day, joffre convinced, after defeat in alsace-lorraine , air , cavalry reports of strong german forces in belgium, german centre in ardennes must weak. on 21 august french second army pressed german counterattack. Édouard de castelnau asked permission abandon nancy , fortified heights, joffre forbade him so.

with french third , fourth armies attacking ardennes, , infantry outpacing horsedrawn artillery, bulow s german second army attacked lanrezac , forced bridgeheads across meuse. fifth army attacked on right max von hausen s german third army; although these attacks held, lanrezac asked joffre permission retreat. on 23 august fifth army attacked again.

on 23 august joffre reported adolphe messimy, french war minister, fourth army pressing ardennes (he believed, wrongly) local numerical superiority, despite fact had received reports of french defeats in sector on previous days. german fourth , fifth armies in fact advancing against french forces in front of them rather moving westwards joffre believed. in memoirs joffre later admitted had been mistaken (he unaware of fall of namur , of extent of fighting @ mons , charleroi on left), @ time demanded french fourth army resume offensive , provide lists of unsatisfactory officers dismissal. messimy supported joffre in purge of unsuccessful generals, suggesting that, in 1793, of them ought executed.

retreat

on 25 august, rejecting advice of staff officer general berthelot lanrezac ordered attack westwards against inside of german right wing, instead had major maurice gamelin draw plans french concentration @ amiens, many of troops drawn french right wing in alsace, , regret ordered successful counterattacks of third army , army of lorraine called off. michel-joseph maunoury put in command of newly formed sixth army, assembled near amiens , fell toward paris (26 august).

concerned @ reports (which later turned out exaggerated) british had been defeated @ le cateau , need french protection recover cohesion, on 27 august joffre gave lanrezac direct written order counterattack forces on open ground, use artillery, lanrezac had told him key factor. after lanrezac spent day arguing against order, joffre visited him @ 8.30 am on 28 august , ordered him attack west. after heated discussion, joffre had gamelin draw written order , signed in lanrezac s presence.

fernand de langle de cary s fourth army, intended spearhead of attack ardennes, strong force , had made several counterattacks, joffre ordered cease counterattacking , send detachment under ferdinand foch cover gap between fourth , fifth armies; became new ninth army.

joffre turned @ lanrezac s headquarters supervise conduct of battle of guise (29 august), willing if necessary sack him there , then. in event impressed lanrezac s cool demeanour , handling of battle. result of battle, alexander von kluck s german first army broke off attacks on maunoury s sixth army , swung south-east, inside of paris.

the marne

messimy, war minister, ordered joffre provide 3 active corps defend paris on 25 august, joffre, regarding interference strategy, ignored him. on 26 august rené viviani formed new government (the union sacrée), , on 27 august new war minister, alexandre millerand, had replaced messimy largely because of poor state of paris defences, visited joffre. general promised provide 3 corps paris if maunoury s attack near amiens failed.

on 30 august joffre recommended french government evacuate paris , learned of russian disaster @ tannenberg, although aware 2 german corps still headed east reinforcements east prussia. on 1 september fifth army retreated across aisne in confusion, , joffre issued instruction generale no 4, placing maunoury s sixth army under command of joseph gallieni military governor of paris , forming new cavalry corps under louis conneau fill gap between fifth army , british expeditionary force (bef). @ stage mind still leaning towards berthelot s old suggestion fifth army attack westwards against inside of german right wing.

on 2 september, anniversary of battle of sedan, government left paris bordeaux. day joffre placed maunoury under gallieni s direct command armies of paris , had millerand place gallieni under own command. joffre planned retreat behind seine before counterattacking. envisaged battle , take place around 8 september, between horns of paris , verdun. . sacked lanrezac on afternoon of 3 september, replacing him more aggressive louis franchet d espèrey.

on night of 3–4 september joffre sent handwritten note gallieni, wanting maunoury push east along north bank of marne, although not specifying date. in line modification of instruction general no 4 (2 september), envisaging giant pocket paris verdun, of enclosed copies gallieni. @ 9.45 am on 4 september gallieni, had learned paris aviators previous day kluck s german first army marching south-east across paris, had first of series of telephone calls, conducted through aides, joffre not come phone, , gallieni refused speak else. gallieni proposed, depending on how further germans allowed advance, attack north of marne on 6 september or south of marne on 7 september.

joffre s reply saying preferred southern option (which take day longer forced sixth army cross south of marne, keep sixth army , bef being separated river) arrived late reach gallieni, had left meeting bef chief of staff, archibald murray. same afternoon, henry wilson, bef sub-chief of staff, negotiating separate plans franchet d espèrey, on british right, envisaged sixth army attacking north of marne.

in absence of news franchet d espèrey, joffre ordered gamelin draft orders maunoury attack south of marne on 7 september. intention passed on sir john french. while joffre having dinner british liaison officer, sidney clive, , 2 visiting japanese officers, neither of whom appeared understand word of french, message arrived franchet d espèrey saying ready attack on 6 september. @ point gallieni, returned paris find joffre s message earlier in day , message wilson, insisted on speaking joffre on telephone, informing him late cancel movement of maunoury s army. joffre agreed bring forward allied offensive 6 september , have sixth army attack north of marne instead, later writing had done reluctantly maunoury make contact germans on 5 september, day have left germans in more disadvantageous position. tuchman argues may have been swayed dominant personality of gallieni, former superior. @ 10 pm joffre issued general order no 6, ordering general allied offensive.

on 7 september gallieni, had been going on joffre s head , speaking war minister , president raymond poincaré, ordered not communicate directly government. left joffre all-powerful (in gallieni s description), had sacked many generals, leaving gallieni serious rival. december 1914 gallieni being mooted potential commander-in-chief in joffre s place, or minister of war, or both.